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This paper contains four variations on Duhem's theme about the contrast between the abstract French mind and the concrete British mind.  The first variation brings out the real contrast between two types of methods and their results: the A(bstract) method or models and the C(oncrete) method or models.  The second variation gives a critical discussion of the Callender-Cohen deflationary contruel of scientific representation.  The third variation discusses Russell's structuralism in connection to the theme.  And the fourth variation critically discusses the relationship between models and fiction in connection to the distinction between the A-models and the C-models.  A coda maps out (without sufficiently detailed arguments) the author's view on the nature of the C-models and why they, and only they, can be viewed as fully fictional.  
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1. The Theme by Duhem
“To a Frenchman and a German,” Pierre Duhem, a profoundly philosophically minded French physicist, wrote before the turn of the twentieth century in a now famous text whose English translation bears the title of The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory,​[1]​ “a physical theory is essentially a logical system.  Perfectly rigorous deductions unite the hypotheses at the base of a theory to the consequences which are derivable from it and are to be compared with experimental laws. … … Thus the French and German founders of mathematical physics, the Laplaces, the Fouriers, the Cauchys, the Amperes, the Gauses, the Franz Neumanns, have constructed with extreme caution the bridge intended to connect the point of departure of the theory, the definition of the magnitudes it is to deal with, and the justification for the hypotheses which will bear its deductions to the road on which its algebraic development will proceed.” (Duhem 1954, p. 78)  
In stark contrast, Duhem continued, “[u]nderstanding a physical phenomenon is, …, for the physicists in the English school, the same thing as designing a model imitating the phenomenon; whence the nature of material things will be understood by imagining a mechanism whose performance will represent and simulate the properties of bodies.  The English school is completely committed to the purely mechanical explanations of physical phenomena.” (p. 72) 
And furthermore this profound difference between the English and the Continental ways of theory construction was seen as a species of a more general difference between two types of minds – the deep and narrow versus the ample and shallow.  “The opposition between the French mind, strong enough to be unafraid of abstraction and generalization but too narrow to imagine anything complex before it is classified to a perfect order, and the ample but weak mind of the English will come to us constantly while we compare the written monuments raised by these two peoples.” (p. 64)
For examples, Duhem compared Shakespeare’s plays with the classical French theatre noting the chaos and heterogeneity of plots and dialogues in the former versus the formal rigor and elegance of the same in the latter.  In physics, while Maxwell’s genius in constructing such models as the phantom ‘displacement current’ in dielectric materials, which is an imitation of Ampere’s real current in conductors, was acknowledged and even admired, William Thomson’s, or Lord Kelvin’s, many mechanical ‘inventions’, such as one finds in his magisterial treatise  Lectures on Molecular Dynamics, were regarded as distasteful monstrosities; and most repugnant of all were the many mechanical models for the aether that particularly excited and exercised the English mind, which to Duhem was a clear demonstration of degenerate method if not degenerate mind.  
What is remarkable upon a closer reading of this portion (chapter IV of part I) of Duhem’s book is that there are no clear-cut examples of the products of a Continental mind.  It was acknowledged that the best of the Continental thinkers also build models, and yet theirs are either not nearly numerous or not as grotesquely in mechanical details as the English ones.  This raised the question of whether Duhem was against building models in theory construction at all or he was just against building mechanical models, which follows from a general distaste for the philosophy of mechanisticism that was thought to have mostly been brought to high fashion by the British minds in the late nineteenth century.  Perhaps implicit in Duhem’s observations is a division of ‘good models’ versus ‘bad models’.  


2. The First Variation: methods rather than minds
It would be easy and entirely justified to dispute and even reject Duhem’s characterization of the English or the French mind; even Duhem himself qualified such a crude dichotomy by giving examples of some of the best French minds engaging in model building, e.g. Descartes was no less imaginative than Maxwell in constructing his vortices in cosmology and Napoleon’s mind was terribly ample but shallow.  And yet, Duhem may well be re-interpreted as trying to distinguish two types of minds, regardless of whether they could be neatly instantiated in two separate nations or regions.  The fact that no actual male body exemplifies pure masculinity, or no actual female body pure femininity, does not refute the distinction between the two opposite dispositions.  But it still seems problematic to think that a specific way of doing physics strictly corresponds to a type of mind.  It does not seem plausible that such a claim can have any credibility in contemporary psychology.  However, when Duhem uses the term ‘mind’ to denote an English or a French mind, he is perhaps best understood not as talking about it in psychological terms or in terms of what today’s philosophers of mind would be permitted to use.  
Hence, instead of thinking that the two kinds of mind, the ample and the deep, are attached to actual nations or cultures or literally to types of minds, which now appears totally unacceptable, we may simply take them to be two alternative (scientific) methods which are frequently adopted by minds of two different dispositions (where the dispositions are characterized in psychological terms that refer to more general features, such as preferring simple and elegant things to complicated and messy ones).  
One method of constructing and evaluating a theory for a given phenomena in physics is aimed at representing the phenomena in highly abstract terms and discovering general principles or lawful propositions among the terms.  Let’s henceforth call this method the A method, for being abstract or axiomatic.  From the abstract propositions, rigorous logical and mathematical derivations may be given whose end-products may then be brought into comparison with experimental generalizations.  The method does not so much condemn model-building practices as shuns them; and even if models are built and used in such a method, they are models of abstraction as to allow further distancing from concrete and actual systems or events, rather than models of ‘flesh and blood,’ i.e., models whose physical embodiment play an indispensible role in explanation and prediction, two of the main aims of science.  When Duhem mentioned that the French or Continental mind would shrink a body in a system into a dimensionless point with its mass and charge, etc., he was thinking of this act as one of idealization and abstraction rather than model-making.  To make a finer point, if Duhem were to endorse any acts of model-building, i.e. in terms of a more general notion of model-building that is current in today’s philosophy of science literature, he would endorse only those models in which components or terms are regarded entirely abstractly, such as points of mass and charge, lines of (electromagnetic or gravitational) potentials and some such purely geometric items.
The other method – let’s call it C method, for being concrete – encourages and values model-building activities as essential to scientific representation.  It is not that this method uses any less mathematics than the A method does; the difference lies chiefly in the ways in which the phenomena are represented, ontologically regarded, and explained.  Here is how Duhem is regarding the difference of representation.  For the A method, the representation is entirely abstract: measureable magnitudes are defined and symbolized and functional relations among such magnitudes or time-evolution equations of these, or sets of these, magnitudes are given.  What these magnitudes ‘embody’ as physical systems are not important and only left to our faculty of imagination which according to Duhem has little to do with science.  In contrast, the C method uses representations that are concrete systems of mostly observable parts, and how concrete it goes depends of course on what types of models are called for: some types such as hydraulic models of air flows are more so than others such as the model of a stock market.  How should the phrase “concrete systems of mostly observable parts” be understood in general is, on the one hand, crucial to the distinction between the two methods and difficult to unpack with complete satisfaction, on the other.  I shall return to this point in Section 4 when I discuss Russell and structuralism.     
If, for the sake of argument, we have two theories, T1 and T2, of the same phenomena, e.g. the weather of London, which are obtained by the two methods, the A method for T1 and the C method for T2, and the only difference between the two is that the weather is represented in T2 by a system with parts of observable objects while it is represented by in T1 entirely abstractly.  The same set of variables (which may be called differently but measure in the same way the happenings in the weather) are used in both, the same set of empirical generalizations obtained, and the same mechanical laws used.  In this case, the model in T2 is literally an extra element when compared with T1; and the question is, which is Duhem’s point, why do we need such a thing, or what advantage could T2 have over T1?  Otherwise, T1 is better because it does the same job with less.  As I mentioned above, the chief difference between the two methods is how the phenomena is represented, ontologically regarded, and explained.  So far, the C method doesn’t seem to have any advantage over the A method.  Can we always regard the models with concrete details ontologically real, namely, telling us what the represented systems really are?  Such questions are notoriously difficult to answer, not only as general philosophical questions but also as historical ones.  Did astronomers defending the Ptolemaic system believe ontologically in the reality of all the epicycles?  Did Lord Kelvin believe ontologically in his convoluted ether models?  Do physicists today believe ontologically in the ‘ghosts’ in the Higgs mechanism?  A more poignant case in point: we know that the superstring theory of elementary particles is supported by a mathematical theory that as mathematics is mature and sophisticated so that the kind of logical rigor that Duhem demands as the quality of a Continental mind is in ample evidence.  The problem is with the model of the strings, which is baffling if it is taken as a concrete physical system.  But isn’t there a perfectly sound Duhemian argument against questioning the superstring theory because one cannot conceive of a plausible model for the strings?  
If anyone gives up superstring theory just because its concrete model appears baffling and does this consistently for every newly proposed theory, she is justifiably condemned by the Duhemians; but we like most scientists are wiser than that.  To regard a concrete model as real does not commit us to the overly naïve stance that says the real thing is exactly like the model.  A more reasonable view that is consistent with realism is to (1) believe that the model refers to something real that exists independently of how we think of it and (2) think that the model resembles approximately the real thing, where what degrees of resemblance counts as acceptably approximate depends on a number of pragmatic factors that include the demand of explanation/understanding and the expectation of the discipline and (3) believe that the degree of approximation can always be improved as we know more about superstrings.  
Here a lesson from Locke may be noted.  Locke thought that our ideas of secondary qualities of external bodies are caused by the secret powers of those bodies that are forever concealed from us.  We may have genuine knowledge of the bodies but not their secret powers because by the basic principle of empiricism we can only know them through secondary qualities (together with ideas of primary qualities on the macroscopic scale).  Such a view can no longer be held because we no longer have to depend on our impressions of color or warmth or texture in order to know about an object.  In order to know, for instance, the color and warmth of a certain surface, we only need to measure the frequencies of the reflected electromagnetic waves and the frequencies of vibration of the molecules on the surface.  Whether or not these frequencies are indeed the intrinsic properties of the waves and the surface may be a more profound philosophical question, but there is no denying that Locke is wrong to think that just because we cannot observe the ‘secret powers’ that produce the secondary qualities which do not belong to the bodies themselves, we are forever barred from knowing what those powers are.  Similarly, just because what the superstrings represent cannot ‘look like’ spacetime strings does not entail that no improved models will tell us what they really are.  
As for explanation, is it true then that a theory made by using the A method simply cannot explain? ​[2]​  It is obviously not true; an abstract theory may provide just as much causal explanations of a certain phenomenon as the concrete theory.  It all depends on what kind of explanation is expected, and sometimes too much concrete details hinders rather than aids the effort of explanation (cf. Bokulich 2004).  Including the size and shape, not to mention all the surface attachments, of the earth does not help at all if what we want explained is why it revolved around the sun in the observed orbit.  However, there are also many cases of explanation in which an abstract theory is simply not adequate.  Imagine trying to explain the weather phenomena by using an abstract theory of air mass, treating clouds and such merely by their geometric size and shapes and their mass, or trying to explain divorce in a society by using an abstract theory of econometrics (where humans are represented as perfectly rational agents).  
All the above only make sense if it is safe to assume that models are separable from the largely ‘syntactic’ part of a theory.  In other words, exchanging the model in the C method with the abstract and meaningless representation in the A method does not jeopardize in any way the theory’s systematic and predictive power.  Whatever phenomenon saved by the C theory is save equally well by the A theory.  This assumption is by no means obvious for all, or even for most, theories in science.  Hesse (1966) talked about the positive, the negative, and the neutral analogies in her study of models.  While the positive analogies are those properties in which the model is analogous to the modeled and the negative analogies those in which they are not analogous, the neutral analogies are those properties in which we are not yet sure whether the model and the modeled are analogous (see Hesse 1966, 8-9).  We may have good reasons to think that superstrings are like ordinary strings in that they have certain length (positive), and we know that they are not elastic as rubber strings (negative), but could they be like the strings that have thickness such that they are three dimensional objects (neutral)?  Neutral analogies, if sufficiently significant, will almost certainly matter to how the syntactic part is constructed, or at least matter to how that part is treated.  







3. The Second Variation: models and representation
Models are often regarded within or without philosophical literature as representational devices, and scientific theories, which may or may not include models, must be able to represent before they can be used for other purposes, such as to explain and predict.  And how well theories can provide explanations and predictions must depend crucially on how well they represent the phenomena in question.  Part of Duhem’s complaint about models being superfluous derives from his belief that one does not need models to fulfill the aim of science, namely, prediction (if not explanation).  Although he does not explicitly mention or argue for it in his book, Duhem no doubt believes that theories can represent without models.  
A version of this attitude, albeit with more sophistication, was recently expressed in an article by Callender and Cohen (Callender & Cohen 2006), in which is given what I shall call a ‘deflationary’ concept of scientific representation.  The upshot of the Callender-Cohen idea is that models don’t have to be ‘models’ in order to fulfill their representational role​[3]​ (where the models we have been considering so far are taken to be artifacts, material or mental, that show a resemblance of some sort to the represented); anything, any device, can be a model, as long as it successfully represents the system it is intended for.  Callender and Cohen in a sense resolved the Duhem problem concerning the use of models in science by re-conceiving what models may be as representational devices.  As we noted earlier, even in the A method, a system has to be represented in some way before a theory can be conceived about it; and right there models are employed in the Callener-Cohen deflationary sense.   
Callender and Cohen suggest in their paper that much confusion in the literature comes from trying to provide answers for the wrong questions: a case in point: people have been trying to figure out in what general and minimal sense a model could be said to resemble its target – whether it be similarity or isomorphism – while addressing the question of what it is that constitute the relationship between the two.  This mistake, they argue, is caused by confusing the ‘constitution question’ about models or modeling in science with the ‘demarcation problem’ whose solution demands some sort of criterion for distinguishing those representational devices that can from those that cannot serve specific purposes (similarity is obvious important if the model is created to provide a visual representation of the target).  And this problem should be further distinguished, according to Callender and Cohen, from what they termed the ‘explanatory/normative problem’ of scientific models and modeling, which looks for answers to questions such as ‘what makes a model the correct model for a given phenomenon,’ or the question ‘in virtue of what do models represent and how do we identify what constitutes a correct representation?’ as they quoted from a paper by Margaret Morrison (Morrison 2006, my italics).
These distinctions are long overdue, and one couldn’t help recalling a similar situation in the theory of truth.  The inquiry into what truth is and how it can be found had been regarded one of the most profound and difficult undertakings in the history of philosophy until Tarski came along and offered his deflationary idea of what truth is, namely, the scheme of ‘s’ is true if and only if s.  However, this answer to the constitutional question of truth does nothing to tell us which sentences in a given domain are true and which are not, nor does it show which true sentences are important to us and which are trivially true.  
The basic idea of the Callender-Cohen deflationary theory is that scientific representations are derivative representational devices that are reducible to the fundamental devices, which are kinds of mental states that people (e.g. members of a scientific community) agree by convention to use as chosen tags for the target phenomena/systems.  What these mental states are may be a deep metaphysical or scientific question of cognition that does not have to be answered, or might have controversial answers, before we know exactly what models are and how they represent.  Special Griceanism is where Callender and Cohen begin and it is basically a reductive account of how linguistic tokens function as representation of objects or states of affairs in reality.  Words or sentences on paper or other surfaces which are intended as linguistic or graphic representational devices do their job by being related to mental states that reliably appear in a person’s head when what they represent is intended to be reflected or communicated.  Scientific representational devices, such as models, do their job in accordance with General Griceaism, which is a natural extension of Special Griceanism to representational devices in general.  The basic scheme of representation is of course the same, and it gives a unified account of how any derivative representational devices do their job in representing the world to us.  To aid their arguments, Callender and Cohen mentioned such acts of representation as lanterns being raised in a certain way at a certain hour to represent the presence or absence of enemy troops, or more dramatically, salt shaker on your dinner being used to represent your favorite geographical region Madagascar (Callender & Cohen 2006, 13-14).  The key and only condition of adequacy is that the right intentional states are invoked among the users of the devices.  
Neither Special nor General Griceanism, according to Callender and Cohen, can or needs to spell out what kind of fundamental devices we must have in order for us to have successful representation.  One only needs a plausible argument for the reduction of the derivative devices to the fundamental ones and for ensuring that the nature of reduction does not in principle put any constraints on what types of entities may serve as models.  The conclusion is that on this aspect of General Griceanism, little if anything more needs to be said beyond what is already said in Special Griceanism about linguistic devices.  As long as symbolic markings or objects are used to evoke corresponding mental states that by convention reliably produce understandings of the represented, anything can be a model.  
In this respect, Teller (2001) can also be viewed as holding a similar deflationary theory for models and modeling.  Regarding what scientific models should be, he says.

I take the stand that, in principle, anything can be a model, and that what makes a thing a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a representation of something by the model users.  Thus in saying what a model is the weight is shifted to the problem of understanding the nature of representation (Teller 2001, 397).

And so perhaps to a less straightforward sense does van Fraassen think of representation when he observe that if one is to have a theory of representation (which he doesn’t) one must accept what he takes as the ‘Hauptsatz’: “There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or so.” (van Fraassen 2008, 23).  And for any object or state of affars, what things so ever cannot be used to represent it if stipulated by a convention?  So, anything can be used to represent and what counts as correct representation is a matter of convention (i.e. pragmatics).  
And if this is right, if anything can be used to represent anything as long as the right mental states are invoked, such hotly debated notions as the ‘similarity’ between the model and the modeled or the ‘isomorphism,’ or some even fancier terms such as ‘partial isomorphism,’ between the two have nothing to do with the ‘constitution’ of scientific representation that we call ‘models;’ (see also Suárez 2003 on this point).  

Two separate questions
Be that as it may, I still see a fundamental problem being evaded here.  When we ask how scientific models represent, we may be taken as asking one of the following two distinct questions.  We may be asking 
(1) What kind of devices is appropriate for us to use in representing the world around us?
Or 
(2) How do we represent the world around us?    
Question (1) is answered by the deflationary theory while question (2) is not.  Or perhaps I should say that in order to answer question (2), we need to know at least some general constraints on the fundamental representations (which are supposed to be in our head).  In other words, the question about scientific models or representation is not only (or really) a question about what external devices we can use to represent but also (or rather) a question about what can be the content of our mental states when we act to represent.  It is at least about what general constraints need to be placed on such contents.​[4]​  
To put this point slightly differently which may highlight the difference, we could say that the question about scientific representation (models and modeling) is about (a) how we can put in material or visual forms what fundamental representations we have in our mind and more importantly (b) how we can put in material or visual forms what an extended fundamental representations we have in our mind.  The extended fundamental representations are those for things we cannot directly perceive, such as atoms or electromagnetic field.  And I suggest that our scientific models for such things are material or symbolic replications of what we ‘see’ in our mind’s eye of what they really are, or at least what scientists would like to have us see.  It is certainly not true in this sense that any devices, words, lanterns, or gestures, would do, as the deflationary theory claims.
From the deflationary theory we get: anything can be used to represent what we want to represent as long as it evokes the right kind of mental states in our each other’s mind, but what does that mean?  What could be the content of such mental states?  First of all, it must contain the belief that accomplishes the reduction as mentioned above.  Whatever it is, and it could be of various kind, the belief has to be of the effect (which one must recognize in one’s mind) that the device refers to the object that it is agreed upon to pick out.  When my community agrees to use three coconuts hanging above the front door to signal a medical emergency inside, a belief state must be evoked by that whose content must be something to the effect that the holder of that belief knows that there is a medical emergency inside that door when seeing three coconuts hanging above it.  Secondly, it also contains something else, something in my mind that allows me to connect the device with, an image of that which the device is used to represent, perhaps?  Can that be anything we want, just as what the deflationist would say a model can be?  
When the problem we should be investigate is “how do we (humans) represent the external world around us?” rather than “what we can use as props or marks to represent something else in the world around us?” the deflationary theory is no longer adequate.  The question about models and modeling may well be taken as concerning the former rather than the latter problem.  Callender-Cohen and Teller are right to argue that derivative representations must be reducible to the primary ones in order to work, and the primary representation is done in our head, but they are wrong in thinking that realizing the reductional relation is all that is needed to solve the constitution problem of models and modeling in science.  Scientific representation in the form of modeling is not aimed at coming up with symbols or objects that help us to bring out what is in our head or what should be in our head that ultimately represents; it is rather aimed at finding appropriate material or symbolic rendering of that primary representation in our head.​[5]​
Wittgenstein once proposed in his Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1961) a picture theory of meaning, and we find statements such as “A proposition is a picture of reality.  A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (4.01).”  “One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are combined with one another.  In this way the whole group – like a tableau vivant – presents a state of affairs (4.0311).”  Now if it is up to Callender and Cohen or Teller, regarding propositions (if they accept the existence of propositions, which they are unlikely to do) as pictures of reality may be overreaching and unnecessary but to regard them as ‘models of reality’ is surely unproblematic.  In general, as far as representing the world around us is concerned, the picture theory of meaning should be acceptable to the deflationists.  
Now here is a simple example that ought to be entirely unproblematic for Wittgenstein and the deflationists, and yet it does not seem quite right intuitively.  What makes a word in English, such as ‘water’, represents water must be the same as what makes an object (serving as a model as the word means in common-sense), such as a plastic array of water molecules denoted by ‘W’, represents it.  In other words, ‘water’ is a model of water in the same sense W​[6]​ is.  And if Wittgenstein is right, ‘water’ is a picture just as W is one, and both are no less pictures of water than a photo of a glass of clear water.  They may differ in their pragmatic roles in representing the thing, and yet as far as constitutional question is concerned, they are all pictures/models of water.  
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning has been widely criticized and I doubt any philosophers today still believe in it.  Looking at one particular criticism briefly may help us to see more clearly the difference between the two questions (1) and (2) mentioned a few pages back.  In a critical discussion of ‘The Picture Theory of Meaning,’ E. Daitz (Daitz 1956) argued that Wittgenstein’s theory couldn’t be right because of some fundamental differences between words and sentences on one side and pictorial objects, such as painting, sculpture, and mechanical models, on the other, in terms of how they represent what they do.  
Pictorial representations in general, which Diatz called ‘iconic,’ contain elements that represent corresponding elements in the represented; and in addition, although the elements do not have to individually bear any resemblance relations, the connection among the representing elements must bear certain perceptually identifiable resemblance to the relationship among represented elements; and it is this latter feature that distinguishes this type of representation from what Diatz called ‘purely conventional’ representations, to which linguistic ones belong.  To use our example given above, the word ‘water’ is elemented by ‘w’, ‘a’, ‘t’, ‘e’, ‘r’, which do not correspondent to any element of the represented, namely, to any element of water, and moreover, the concatenation of these letters show no resembling relation to the chemical bound that connect those elements.  On the contrary, the molecular model W of water is a typical example of the iconic representation, where each distinct part of the plastic model correspond, in however a rough and ready way, a water molecule, and how those plastic parts are put together is supposed to resemble the chemical bounding of the water molecules.  
Therefore we can say, and there is no question that Diatz is right on this point, that we can represent an apple, an traffic accident, a scene in a play, or even an imaginary creature, such as Santa Clause, both with propositions and pictures, but propositional representations are fundamentally different from pictorial ones, even with respect to the most fundamental constitutional question of representation.  Iconic representations and conventional ones are of two mutually exclusive (and perhaps jointly exhaustive) methods of representation.  To argue for such an intuitively appealing claim one would have to figure how our mind ultimately represents the world around us.  In other words, it is the question I raised earlier when criticizing Callender and Cohen, namely, we need to find out what constraints the primary mental states that do the representation in our mind.  It is nothing less than part of the investigation of the mind-world relation.  
Another of Callender-Cohen’s thesis is that we can bracket the inquiry into the question of fundamental devices (which are appropriate mental states) when we investigation the various problems of scientific presentation.  The constitution problem can be solved, as we saw above, through understanding the reductional relationship between derivative and fundamental devices (General Griceanism); and the demarcation problem concerning what types of devices are correct scientific models can be solved through pragmatic considerations such as matching the right type with the right needs in scientific explanation and/or prediction.  Seeing in this manner, the question about whether similarity or isomorphism is in some sense indispensible in scientific representation should not be regarded as relevant to the constitution problem; and at most it might be relevant to the demarcation problem because it is really a matter of pragmatics.  
This thesis, we should by now realize, is not quite right.  If there is a sense, which by now we should have no doubt, in which the constitution problem is a problem about the fundamental devices, about how we represent in the basic sense, then it matters whether relations such as similarity or isomorphism are required.  The reason for this point is very simple.  Despite the widespread use of conventional devices by humans to represent whatever they want to represent such that it appears anything can be used to represent anything, our mind may ultimate only represent what we experience pictorially or non-pictorially or it represents some parts of reality pictorially but other parts non-pictorially.  The very fact that it takes agreement within a community to use the conventional devices to represent reality means that the mind does not use anything like those (e.g. impressions that resemble those) to represent reality.
I do not pretend that I can discuss here in high degree of care and clarity the question of how we represent as one of the most fundamental questions of the mind-world relation.  But these observations should be safe to make.  If our mind represents the external world around us mainly in iconic ways​[7]​: we see shapes and colors and so forth, and we hear sounds of different pitches, and we feel bodies of different textures, and such are indeed in the content of our mental states that constitute our experience​[8]​, then we have sufficient reasons to demand that our models of what we can experience directly (i.e. the observables) pictorially resemble what we see, hear, and/or feel.  Conventional devices may have to be used when for one reason or another it is not a good idea to try to construct pictorial models.  Bohr’s model of hydrogen atoms comes to mind, and this is an issue I will return in the next two variations in which I discuss in turn structuralism and model’s connection to fiction.  However, if our mind did not represent the world chiefly in pictorial ways, then pictorial devices have to be regarded as conventional and reductions have to be carried out in order to connect such a device to the fundamental device that our mind used.  Imagine that computers as they are made now (not some future supercomputers that might have humanlike capacity of perception) have consciousness and are engaged in discussing this very same issue.  Since they do not ‘experience’ the world around them by anything other than strings of binary characters, their fundamental device of representation might well be non-pictorial; and they represent the world primarily by propositions, which are not and cannot be pictures, as Diatz convincingly explained.  




4. The Third Variation: models and structure
“The French or German physicist conceives,” Duhem wrote in the chapter whose text I quoted in Section 1 to broach the theme, “in the space separating two conductors, abstract lines of force having no thickness or real existence; the English physicist materializes these lines and thickens them to the dimensions of a tube which he will fill with vulcanized rubber.  In place of a family of lines of ideal forces, conceivable only by reason, he will have a bundle of elastic strings, visible and tangible, firmly glued at both ends to the surfaces of the two conductors, and, when stretched, trying both to contract and to expand….” (Duhem 1954, p. 70).  Moreover, as he explained in more detail what a French or German physicist, “be he a Poisson or a Gauss” (p. 69), would do for the study of two conductors in space, Duhem described a method of idealization by abstraction: idealizing the two conductors into two point charges in empty space, and imagining the electric force acting along the 1-d line that connects the two points, etc.  The rest, such as establishing the equation for the force and its effects on the movement of the point charges, and how such equations can be used to derive observable results, are, I assume, shared activities by both schools, or with any other school that is capable of producing a workable theory for electromagnetism. 
In today’s conception of models and the model-building practice (Morgan & Morrison 1999, Hughes 1997), we would say that both Continental physicists and British ones are engaged in model building, the only difference is that they build different kinds of models.  The French and the German, if Duhem is correct, which is a big ‘if’ that I shall not entertain, are accustomed to using the highly abstract models, while the British like to indulge themselves with concrete ones.  By “today’s conception”, I here refer to the literature on scientific representation that traces its most recent root in the semantic approach to scientific theories (cf. van Fraassen 1980).  We now know that model construction with idealization and approximation is indispensible in the practice of science across the spectrum of its diverse disciplines, whether it is in physics or in sociology.  However, Duhem’s theme, when properly interpreted, does spot a tension in methodology.  The tension is between going with highly abstract models/theories in representing a certain domain of phenomena and going with more concrete models/theories.  In other words, the tension between the A method and the C method is a real tension but a tension within model-building methodology; and it is not just a matter of style, or so shall I argue in this and the next variation.  
I want to suggest here that the tension is mostly created by differences of philosophical or semi-philosophical viewpoints, which appear not just among philosophers of science, and it is resolved among non-philosophers mostly by pragmatic considerations.  With observable, macroscopic systems it seems that abstract models with varying degrees of abstraction are most appropriate.  We hardly need any concrete models to represent such systems when they are there for us to ‘see.’  Such models are necessarily results of idealization in terms of abstracting away properties that are not pertinently related to the ones we study.  With unobservable or microscopic systems, models of both types may be needed; and when the models are concrete ones, they are often the results of analogical reasoning.  According to Hesse (1966), three types of analogies are involved when analogical models are used.  The positive analogies refer to properties of which the models and the modeled are known to be analogous, and the negative analogies to properties of which the two are known to be disanalogous, while neutral analogies are those of which we do not yet know whether the two are analogous.  We can and would want to use a concrete model for a system only if we have some independent idea about what the system is like, and for practical reasons there should be some neutral analogies for us to speculate on.  If there are more positive analogies than negative ones, we then have reason to expect that the neutral analogies would turn into positive ones; and there lies the main attraction of a concrete model.  And if this argument for concrete models is right, one could respond to Duhem’s dismissal of the C method by saying that the concrete models are not solely for the vague purpose of understanding; it can also suggest new aspects about the modeled systems of which the mathematical formulation is yet to reach.  
Be that as it may, we should nonetheless acknowledge as real the tension between the A and the C method and find out philosophically what more we can say about it.  Before exploring the nature of this tension one should note that it is one of those notoriously difficult problems, whose difficulty lies more in its subtleness than its ‘hardness’.  It is difficult, in other words, because if one looks at it in the ‘wrong direction,’ one may completely miss it.  For example, the common sense perspective on this tension, which is probably embraced by most working scientists, would certainly take it to be a tension between two different styles of scientific research.  But philosophically I think there is more to this tension than meets the eye, and to bring this point home, let me connect it to a discussion of structuralism.  
Let’s take a look first of Russell’s structuralism, which is curiously absent in the literature on structural realism.  Again, this is also an exceedingly difficult subject to engage in not because, like the difficulty mentioned above, it is unclear or easily missed, which is never an issue in interpreting Russell, but rather because it is a subject that had occupied Russell all through his life during which he had had more than once changed his mind about it.  Fortunately, for a brief discussion of Russell’s structuralism as this one, I could reply not only on frequent recapitulations, which Russell was rather fond of producing, but also on in-depth critical studies of the subject (cf. Demopoulos & Friedman 1989, Hylton 1990, Demopoulos 2003a).  
Russell’s structuralism is founded on a firm belief that there is a one-one onto mapping between the world of our experience and the real world; in other words, the two worlds are isomorphic to each other.  Although cognitive agents like us only have access to their own experience, the sciences, especially in their theoretical parts, are according to Russell about reality, about facts in the realm of real events and objects – or just events, if objects are regarded as abstractions out of events – that exist independently of us.  However, such scientific knowledge is always highly abstract, containing only propositions about how certain types of events or objects are related to certain other types in a lawful manner or how parts of an object are related to one another.  And all these are characterized by values of variables that are only definable structurally, such as, for instance, the time, position, and momentum of a classical particle, where the first two express temporal and spatial relations, respectively, and the last a potential of motion or motion production that is also a relational magnitude.  The reason for the sciences being so abstract and purely structural is, for Russell, the result of what we have to do to ‘get beyond’ our experience to ‘reach’ reality.  We cannot reach reality as it is, as the thing-in-itself, to borrow a familiar Kantian phrase, directly or via perception because of the mediation of representations in our head; but because of the fact that there exists a structural identity between what exists around us and how it appears to us, which is guaranteed by the relation of isomorphism, we at least can know reality by its structures.  From perception, we are acquainted with our surroundings first and foremost qualitatively, and yet our scientific knowledge can say nothing about what reality is like qualitatively, e.g. it is neither colored nor warm or cold nor loud or quiet nor textured; and therefore, in a sense, the real world is not knowable to us; or we have no right to say, for instance, that an apple is really a solid roundish object with juicy and flavorful flesh wrapped inside a smooth skin that is either green or red (or green or yellow) or a bit of both.  However, we can know the structure – when it is understood as a catchall word for any kind of relational properties – of reality, or we know scientifically that an apple is a three dimensional object that is composed mostly of empty space, and in it molecules of various types that are related in a certain type of configurations – one type for its flesh and another for its skin, etc..  We don’t know what molecules are qualitatively, just as we don’t know what apples are qualitatively, and yet we know how they are made up, i.e. in what configurations, by atoms and how they structurally make up bigger objects, such as apples.  The structure vs. quality distinction is total for Russell, namely, we ‘know’ just about everything that appears to our senses twice over: once by its quality through our senses and then by its structural properties through science.  If one were to invoke Locke and his theory of secondary qualities here, one might say on behalf of Russell that we do know about the ‘secret powers’ of things that produce impressions of secondary qualities, but we know them not as qualities that resemble the representations in our head; we know them as a bunch of numbers, such as frequencies of vibration.    
Russell argued for his structuralist position chiefly by noting the fact that causal chains that preserve perceptual qualities are often made up of radically different media.  Just look at what happens in electronic communication chains, whether it is telephone or television.  To go from what the producers of the records or movies are doing to the listeners or viewers of their products, vast distances are traversed by these products in environments which bear no resemblance to the ones in which they are produced and the ones in which they are shown, and yet incredible fidelity is maintained through the transmission.  The best way to account for such success is to think that what is captured in the production and then transmitted and recovered for the listeners or viewers are the physical structures of the phenomena.  And such structural properties are the only things we can know scientifically of reality and the only thing we need to know for the purpose of using them to explain how things work and events occur causally in reality.  
A brief word about the notion of structure and why structural similarities do not tell us about what things are like as themselves.  A structure in Russell’s sense refers to any relational property of an object (or event): how the parts of it are related to one another and how it is related to other relevant objects, etc.  It turns out to be the same as a quantitative property, and therefore a structural similarity between two objects won’t tell us what the objects are but that the relational properties of the two map in pairs 1-1 onto each other.  It is in this way, and only in this way, Russell argued, that we know the cause of our perception, i.e. all the quantitative aspects of the object we perceive.  When we see a red ball, we may know that it is produced by the arrangement and motion of parts of the ball to produce a certain frequency in the reflected light from its surface.  Such a belief if true is only knowledge about relations in the ball and between parts of the ball’s surface and the light beam that it reflects.   
Putting aside the question of whether or not Russell’s structuralism holds, a question I shall discuss later in this section, I find it illuminating at this juncture to reflect on the above-mentioned tension between the two types of methods or models.  If Russell is right, what science does and can present to us is only a ‘world’ of relations, which means it cannot tell us what the relata of such relations really are.  If we do feel that we know from physics or other sciences what they are like, we do so by adding the perceptual to the structural, whether or not we are justified in so doing.  Sometimes the added perceptual content in helping to construct a model is what we actually perceive, but more often we use what we imagine we might perceive to fill in the structural.  All such addition would be regarded as erroneous according to Russellian structuralism.  
Should we then straightforwardly condemn all scientific models in which terms or images for sensible qualities are regarded as genuinely referring?  Should we then regard Russell’s structuralism as endorsing Duhem’s condemnation of concrete models or the C method?  That is not necessarily true and the reason is simple.  Not all non-qualitative models have to be abstract in the sense that Duhem demands; or concrete models are fine as long as they are quantitative models.  And it all depends on how one interprets the terms or images that are included in a model.  Take Duhem’s example of two charged objects interacting with each other and affecting each other’s movement.  The A model would have us imagine that the charged objects are point particles and the interacting force/field between them as lines of field/force, while the C model include such qualities as the sizes of the objects and the thickness of the lines of field/force.  The latter are indeed sensible qualities for we do represent them as such in our head.  However, they are also structural properties of the objects and field/force as well.  The C model of this system does not have to be thought of as including sensible qualities, nor is the A model of this system the only model that is consistent with Russell’s structuralism.  We only abandon that position for certain if we also include color or hardness in our scientific representation of the charges or lines of force.  
In the previous variation I argued for an anti-deflationary idea which says that scientific models are conceived as answers to questions of how we represent, and our representation of the world around us is primarily iconic rather than conventional.  Now if we incorporate Russell’s structuralism, I should say that the models can and should only be about the structure of the iconic representations in our head.  No qualitative properties of models, physically built or otherwise, should be counted as relevant properties to their representational role.  
Hence, even though Russell did claim that all our scientific descriptions are abstract, he meant by that word in a different and much more general way than Duhem did.  The structures could be of all sorts when we construct models for reality, and the only limit is set by our perceptual experiences.  We are all right so long as there is an isomorphic relation between the structure of our representation and the structure of that which is supposedly causing it.  Salmon (1984) seemed to obviously have Russell in mind when he argued for his view on causal processes as structure carriers.  And here is one of the obvious benefits if Russell is right.  Structuralism means that a resemblance between a theoretical description and its target system can only be a mapping of two sets of relations; and the mapping is either a bijection or an injection or a surjection.  Partial mappings (or partial functions where the mappings are 1-many or many-1) are also sometimes useful, but functions are by far the most common in structural representations of reality.  Qualitative resemblance, a notion that besets the discussion of modeling and simulation, is therefore ruled out.  For Russell, all qualitative stuff only exists in our mind, reality is only known through quantitative resemblances.  
Van Fraassen (1980) also speaks of isomorphism between models and phenomena.  For van Fraassen who espouses a version of empiricism, as oppose to scientific realism, that is called ‘constructive empiricism,’ what constitutes a belief of a theory is not a belief of its being true but rather of its being empirically adequate or its capacity of ‘saving the phenomena;’ and the notion of empirical adequacy is cashed out, according to van Fraassen’s semanticist standpoint on the nature of scientific theories, in terms of an isomorphism between the empirical sub-model of a theory’s model and the phenomena, where the former are constructions in the realm of the observable.  For instance, for a mechanical theory of motion, the theory that is couched in theoretical terms might be a set of differential equations, in which such items as instantaneous velocity or acceleration are not observables.  But it is ultimately connected to trajectories of the moving objects in question, as solutions of those differential equations; and segments of trajectories are certainly observable.  These trajectories are empirically adequate, and so is the whole theory by implication, if and only if they bear a one-one correspondence (i.e. an isomorphism) with what is observed in the labs in which such motions are studied.  
But what does it exactly mean to have a 1-1 onto mapping between structural elements (which comprise an empirical sub-model of a theory) to phenomenal or qualitative elements (which presumably comprise our experience)?  How can a sub-model of statistical mechanics about a bucket of water be isomorphic to our experience of the water’s texture and coolness?  If Russell is right, there couldn’t possibly be any relationship between that model and our qualitative experience of the water in the bucket.  What there is can only be a relationship between that model and the structural elements of our experience, i.e. the structure of the phenomenon, because the relationship is between the model and the cause of our experience and we can only know the cause structurally.  What counts as the phenomenon makes a difference in this case.  If the phenomenon is created by putting my hands into the water to feel its texture and coolness (or warmth), no isomorphism between such qualitative precepts (to borrow a term from Russell) and a sub-model of statistical mechanics is possible.  We would have to invoke the ‘structure’ of the feelings from my hands in order to make sense of the isomorphism.  But what is that structure?  How do we find out about that structure?  Here physics tells us roughly that our feeling of texture and coolness should be accounted for by the viscosity and the temperature of the water; and these can be measured by reliable instruments.  When we read off the numbers from those  appropriate measuring devices, we are ready to think about the isomorphism.  But are the two sets of numbers, one for the viscosity and the other for the temperature, the proper stuff to element a phenomenon?  One may say that such a problem does not exist for our previous example about a moving object since the observed trajectory is a phenomenon and can be regarded as isomorphic to the corresponding solution of the differential equations for the same object.  But if we are talking about a precept, namely, a mental representation of a moving object, there is no ‘observed trajectory’ in our head.  To get a trajectory, instruments have to be used and numbers recorded, so we are looking at the same situation as the water example as far as an isomorphism (or the lack of it) between two structures is concerned.  
These considerations also show how sketchy Russell’s original structuralism is.  To say the cause of our perceptions must be structurally isomorphic with the structure of the percepts (its effect) would not make good sense until we spell out how the structure of our precepts is known, which to say the least are the result of a complex combination of causal factors from outside which may possess extremely heterogeneous structures.  
In a criticism inspired by M. H. A. Newman, Demopoulos and Friedman (1989) pointed out a series of related problems with Russell’s structuralism, but the central problem, as far as I can see, is the one that Newman had seen with great clarity (and Demopoulos & Friedman concurred), namely, for unobservable systems, such as atomic systems or electromagnetic fields, any set of relations satisfy a given structure, so long as enough objects are supposed to exist to fill out the relata.  In other words, if Russell’s structuralism is right, our theoretical physics of the microscopic world, inter alia, is entirely conventional except the determination of the cardinality of the world.  Other than relational properties, there will be no discovery of what kinds stuff populate the microscopic (or the macroscopically large) world.  Whether or not this is a real problem touches on all sorts of problems in philosophy, problems such as whether conventionalism of Poincare’s or Carnap’s persuasion is true, and it also depends on positions on the nature of scientific theory à la Ramsay and Carnap (cf. Demopoulos 2003b) and this paper is not the place to engage an in-depth discussion.  Nor does it have sufficient space to review and join the debate over structural realism, which is obviously very relevant to the discussion in this variation.  All I can do is to provide one observation below without arguing for it in any substantive way, leaving it to another occasion.  
Epistemic structural realism, first broached or revived by Worrall (1989), accepts the existence of particular objects, fields, and perhaps even space-time regions (namely he accepts the existence of the relata) and yet claims that only the structural aspects of such things can be known or belong to the domain of science.  Any qualitative speculations of what the things are have no place in science because they cause among other things discontinuities in the history of science and perhaps even incommensurability.  If one focuses on structures, one sees, give or take a bit, continued accumulative progress in science.  True or not, the position has good historical support as well as philosophical foundations.  Ontic structural realism, first broached or revived by Ladyman (1998), is committed to viewing the structures that science investigates as the only real or existing elements in the world.  The relata, the stuff that makes up the world, are to be banished, and that is because ample evidence from quantum and relativistic physics shows that no conception of such stuff even makes sense.  Given some obvious difficulties for such a position, e.g. it is all right to regard the relata of relations as unknown or even unknowable, but it does not seem to make sense to say that they do not exist, or it does not make good sense to say that there are universals but no particulars that instantiate them, ontic structural realism faces serious challenges, to say the least.  We said earlier that ‘structural’ is almost synonymous with ‘quantitative,’ and what is Q a quantity of if there is nothing of the sort in the world?  Valiant efforts have been made by the ontic structural realists, some of which are philosophically very innovative (see French 2006, Ladyman 2009 and the references therein), but here is a simple suggestion which I find more helpful philosophically as a worldview of science.  




5. The Fourth Variation: models and fiction
As devices of scientific representation, whether their uses are methodologically justified or not, can models be viewed as fiction or fictional objects?  There is a recent flourish of discussion, most of which comprises various defenses of the positive thesis, but the defenses are mostly in the spirit of trying to enrich our understanding of the nature of models and modeling, and so the arguments are mostly along the line of “there seems to be some similarity between models and fiction, so let’s explore the relationship between the two and see what it tells us about models.”
In this section I shall explore this relationship along the line of the philosophers who recently broached the subject (see Frigg 2010, 2011a, 2011b and Suarez 2009a, 2009b), but I shall be more critical.  My aim will be to bring objections to the conceptions of this relationship so that eventually we see in what exact sense we are entitled to say that models in science are like characters or events in a fiction.  
Objections to regarding scientific models as fictional objects should be easy to find.  Science and fiction do not mix in our common sense conception of the two.  Scientific theories are for the real and the actual while fiction depicts by default the opposite.  When something in science is called ‘a fiction,’ it usually means that it is unworthy of science.  And science fiction as a genre of fiction is not, and cannot be regarded as, a discipline in science.  Imagine the surprise if one finds in a bookstore the section of ‘science fiction’ on the same wall for science books right next to such sections as ‘physics,’ ‘biology,’ and ‘psychology.’  
Frigg (2010, 2011a, 2011b) rightly separates two senses of ‘fictional.’  One means simply something untrue or nonexistent, while the other means the result of imagination.  When people call something in science ‘fictional,’ the context in which the term is used demands that the first but not the second sense is meant.  When people called cold fusion, for instance, a piece of fiction, they were not thinking how imaginative that ‘discovery’ is.  This is certainly an important distinction, and yet perhaps it can and should be made a bit more accurate.  One sense of being said to be fictional is not so much of being false as of being non-referring, of not having anything in reality to which the imagined item, an object or an event, correspond.  The other sense is not so much about something being a result of imagination as about it being in imagination.  When we call something fictional in this sense, we intend to stress that it is a thing in the mental realm or it is not in space and time or it is not and cannot be individuated as a particular.​[9]​  Prima facie, if models in science are understood as fictional in the first of these two senses, the understanding is flawed, while it is presumably harmless to regard them as fictional in the second sense.  Nobody would think of models in science, though they sometimes have particulars as their embodiment, as themselves particulars.  This, I think, clearly explains why the material realizations of a model are usually ‘immaterial.’  
 Another point concerning models and fiction needs to be clarified right away.  It is one thing to say some models in science are fiction but quite another to say or imply that all models in science are such.  Frigg appears to be arguing for the second while Suárez (2009a, 2009b) has clearly been arguing for the first thesis.  However, there are ambiguities in these two theses: it is not clear how much Frigg is committed to the idea that models are full-fledged fiction; he seems to be saying rather that there are many significant similarities between models and fiction so much so that we should take the parallel seriously if only for an understanding of some of the so far neglected aspects of models.  While it is possible to concur with Suárez and then simply conclude that not everything in science can or should be taken seriously (scientists sometimes do wrought fictions!), that is clearly not what Suárez intended.  Such fully fictional models as the model of quantum measurement (Suárez 2009b) should, according to Suarez, be taken very seriously.  The conclusion that Suárez draws comes in fact not too far from Frigg’s conclusion, namely, models are fiction and very useful fiction; they are in Suárez’s term “rules of inference.”  One question that kept popping up in my mind when I was going through the literature is: why do we need to identify models in science with fiction (in this or that or some other senses) in order to know what they are?  Is it sufficient rather to regard them as products of imagination or, simply, hypothetical?  I shall keep this question alive in the rest of this discussion.
Since we have already seen arguments to the effect that models are similar to fictional characters and objects, it might be interesting and illuminating to follow through the opposite route: we begin by noticing the dissimilarities between the two, and then bring in the responses of Frigg, Suárez, et al (interpreted versions of such of course) in the hope of obtaining a deeper understanding of the nature of models this way.   

1. While models are conceived to represent real stuff in nature, fictional characters are not conceived or intended that way at all.  There does not seem to be any serious sense in which models such as the Newtonian model of the solar system or Bohr’s model of hydrogen atom belong to the same category as Sherlock Holmes or Santa Claus.  
It is not entirely clear how this challenge is met in the existing literature.  One strategy seems to be admitting that models are regarded and intended by their makers and consumers differently as fictional characters are by their makers and consumers; and yet, it is argued, that they are so similar in most other important aspects that they should be identified despite this difference.  A seemingly more effective response may point out the fact that all scientific models are so idealized that no systems in reality exist the way as depicted by the models.  There are, e.g., no Newtonian solar system or Bohr’s atom in reality, just as there are no Sherlock Holmes or Santa Claus in reality.  However, this is beside the point: models and fictional characters are dissimilar even in this very aspect, namely, what makes Bohr’s model ‘unreal’ is the use of idealization (which is essential to theory construction in science in general), whereas idealization in any shape or form cannot be involved in the creation of fictional characters, or at least good characters are the ones that are as concrete, as non-idealized, as possible; only the bad ones, the ones that we usually see in crude propaganda fiction, are idealized.  If one thinks carefully about the parallel invoked here, one can hardly miss the methodological opposition of modeling and character creation in literature.  The one has a particular – a real system – in the world that it is used to describe and study, and so judicious abstraction is both justified and highly prized.  The other has no particular in the world and yet one ‘particular’ is invented by imagination (not a real particular in the actual world of course but a fully concrete creature in our imagination), and so abstraction is both superfluous and condemned.​[10]​  
One plausible response from the positive view of models and fiction is suggested by the fact that when models are regarded as fictional they are often models of, say, quantum systems, which implies that they are models of the unobservable (see Suárez 2009b).  Since we are in general not able to point to a quantum system and say that it is that of which our model is an account in abstraction, our situation with such models are similar to those with fictional characters.  Again, this seems to be a misplaced point.  Fictional characters are not just unobservable, they are non-existent by default.  No quantum systems – not their models – can be assumed by default in this way; in fact the right metaphysical attitude towards such systems should arguably be that they are just like the macroscopic, observable systems, namely, actual particulars, which happened to be unobservable (a condition that we, the observers, have); and with such an attitude, we imagine in the process of modeling abstract systems that we think could describe the unobservable systems in the same way models of observable systems do.  Some scientists deviate from this attitude and begin to treat the models as if they are the real thing, then they are indeed treating them as fiction and they are wrong; they have confused the representation with the represented and part of philosophers’ job is to correct them.  It would be ill-advised to take such scientists as having obtained some important philosophical insight and draw philosophical conclusions from that, such as thinking that models are fiction after all.  
I do think this last response has some truth in it, and yet this is far from being correct simpliciter.  To get to what really is the case on this matter, we need to see other aspects of this debate.

2. It appears that what models and fictional characters have in common are just that they are mental entities and they are creatures of our imagination.  Too many heterogeneous categories of entities share these two features and yet there is no point of identifying them (imagine someone argues for the similarities between models and theories or models and hallucinations; both would be pointless but for opposite reasons).
To this point, Frigg gives us four reasons for identifying models with fiction.  First, despite its non-referring status, descriptions of fictional characters and objects are meaningful and do inform us about reality; the same is true of models.  Second, fictional characters are assumed to have a ‘full existence’ – in terms of all necessary properties for such an existence – in the fictional world despite limited explicit description; the same is true of models.  Therefore, and third, it always makes sense to finding out the ‘missing aspects’ in the descriptions of fictional characters; and the same is true of models.  And fourth, it does make sense, especially fictional characters and situations in serious literature, to compare what is said with what actually happens.  
Correctly understood, these observations are surely right; but the rub lies in how they may be correctly understood, and that depends on what sort of metaphysics one has in mind when doing the comparison as above.  If models and fiction are understood in a mistaken or inappropriate metaphysics, those claims could be regarded as rather off base.  Here is a brief look of what the difficulty may be.  While fictional characters or events may well have their own ontology, it does not seem reasonable to think that scientific models have their own ontology apart from the ontology of the stuff they are used to represent.  While statements about fictional characters draw their meaning from a semantics that is supported by the metaphysics of fiction, it does not seem reasonable to think of the semantics of scientific statements – which of course use models – have a semantics that is different from factual statements, or does it?
The metaphysics of fiction has always been a small and neglected sub-area in metaphysics​[11]​, but it has been catching more attention in recent years, partly because of recent works by Thomasson (1999) and Jubien (2009).  According to Thomasson, who argues for a realist view of fictional characters and events, the world in which anything fictional exist is the world that is created by the author/maker of the fictional works and exists with such works as cultural artifacts.  And the characters and events are real to those people who are competent in ‘handling fiction,’ who have such capacities as being able to clearly distinguish the fictional world from the actual world and being able to recognize such objects across different texts, stages, and screens.  Statements that are essentially about such objects draw their meaning by having terms referring to the objects in that world of fiction,​[12]​ and the truth-condition for such statements is therefore fixed accordingly.  Prima facie, a fictional world is unlike the actual one in that they do not exist spatiotemporally and there are presumably as many such worlds as has been separately invented in works of fiction​[13]​, and whatever is ‘discoverable’ in such a world must be there by stipulation and consistency.  One can discover something about Harry Potter that is not written in any of the Potter novels as long as it is implied (in the logical sense of implication) by what is written; otherwise nothing is discoverable; however, if laws of nature are assumed in the creation of a fictional world, physical as well as logical possibility and necessity operate in that world.​[14]​  
Rough and incomplete as it is, this sketch of a realist metaphysics of fiction gives us enough idea, I think, to evaluate the comparison of models and fiction.  Frigg’s first point as summarized above is good only if we can embrace the same kind of ontology that fictional worlds receive.  But is that plausible?  Are we ready to defend the idea that there are as many physical worlds as there are different invented models?  This may well be a view that Goodman holds (Goodman 1978), and Frigg may well be a disciple of his, although Goodman’s name is nowhere mentioned in Frigg’s or anyone else’s works on models and fiction.​[15]​  And indeed, if we are willing to embrace a parallel ontology for models in science as containing multiple model worlds, all four observations by Frigg about the similarity between models and fiction make good sense.  The remaining question is about how these worlds are related to the actual world, which has always been recognized in the literature of scientific representation as a serous problem and for which Frigg invented a term, ‘t-representation,’ to study it separately from the ‘p-representation,’ which refers to the relationship between a representational device and the model it p-represents (see Frigg 2011b).  I shall return to this question below.

3. While most of the scientific models refer to types of things, fictional creations are mostly focused on particulars, such as characters and events.​[16]​  When it comes to types of stuff in a fiction, the names usually refer to real stuff in the world.  When Conan Doyle describes the gun Sherlock Holms uses, it is of a type that does exist in the world.  The same is true with people or animals or streets and building, namely, when they are thought of as types of things, they are just ordinary types in the world; although the particular person or animal (e.g. the Hound of Basqueville) or building (e.g. the Mansion on the Wuthering Heights) is fully fictional.  There are some fully fictional types, such as Spiderman’s glue from his palms or quantuniam in “Giants and Aliens”, etc., but they are miner categories in the realm of fiction.  So, models and fictional objects are nothing alike, or so this objection claims.
There is a rather big category of types, such as unicorns, satyrs, etc. if we count mythological creatures, but still they are markedly different from models.  The fictional creatures all have normal, realistic enough parts, while scientific models, especially those for unobservable objects, are typically constituted by parts whose existence is the focus of debate.  It is in this sense, a model of water is the opposite of unicorn; while water as the whole system being modeled is sensible and real enough but the molecules and atoms which are modeled to compose it are speculative, or even fictional, one may say, parts of unicorn are shared by normal animals only the whole system is fictional.  What does this disparity implies?  One superficial answer seems to be that models represent while fictional objects don’t.  The scientific model of water, whether of a whole sample or of its macroscopic parts, is intended to represent whatever stuff that’s in the actual world, while the fictional ‘model’ of a unicorn needs no or little representation of its parts and does not represent anything as a whole.  

To summarize the above in the form of an objection to taking models as fiction, one could say that (1) even though one can create a similar metaphysics for models as for fiction, there does not appear to be enough motivation for doing so; (2) models are typically representational devices while fictional characters and events are typically not; (3) models are mostly types while fictional things, at least the important ones, are mostly particulars; and (4) when fictional objects are types, they are mostly other-worldly, which indicates that when the same categories of things are compared between models and fiction, they really don’t have anything in common (other than the minimal similarity, namely, they are mental or cultural/communal rather than material).  


6. The Coda: two kinds of models again, and the fully fictional
Here is what I think is the case between models and fiction, the arguments for which, too long to be given in this paper, are given in another place.  Duhem is right and profoundly so when he distinguishes the A method and its product from the C method and its.  Philosophers today are wrong when they think of products of the A and the C method as belonging to the same category of models, only that one is more abstract than the other.  We can, and people do, call all of them models: the point-line image of the solar system is a model of it, and the Bohr’s model of hydrogen atom is also a model, and yet if the above analysis about models and fiction is right, these two types of ‘entities’ are of radically different nature.  The first kind, results of the A method, are representational devices, while the second kind, results of the C method, are not.  Roughly speaking, the A-models are used for observable systems, while the C-models are used for unobservable ones.  They are radically different because they have fundamentally different origins.  The A-models, the abstract models of observable systems, are results of idealization, whose purpose is purely practical and they are dispensable once the mathematical theory is fully mastered.  The C-models, the abstract models of unobservable systems, have their origin, I now suggest, deep in the tradition of mythology.​[17]​  In this sense, the A-models have nothing to do with fiction, while the C-models are fully fictional, as mythology and the like are fictional.  They are not created for practical purposes, such as saving intellectual effort, as the A-models do; they are created to fill a deep-seated need of us humans to know what is going on behind/beneath the observable phenomena.  It is in the sense that scientists who investigate the microscopic world have been creating worlds in which postulated creatures are responsible for the few glimpses we humans gain through our limited means of experiments that we see the origin of the C-models.  And in this sense, they are fully fictional.  This explains why the models for the observables are all very abstract while those for the unobservables are often deliberately endowed with observable qualities (e.g. the ‘tangibleness’ of force lines the visual ‘realness’ of a pudding model for atoms).  The former is obvious because why would we want to have a qualitatively similar models except perhaps for educational purposes, while the latter is so because the models are all we have so long as we want to know what the systems we are after may look like.  There are assumed abstractions in such models but the abstractness is a matter of assumption given the scarcity of evidence; it is definitely not the result of idealization since there is nothing for us to idealize about.  From what we may ask is the identicalness of the elementary particles an idealization of?  And because of this fact, many philosophers of science (starting from van Fraaseen 1980, and more recently French 2006) think that elementary particles are identical!  Can we imagine anybody argues for the idea that because most of the time a mass point is what the earth is in our model that earth is really a dimensionless mass object?  Because of observability (or the lack of it) of the whole systems in question, what is a type or a particular is treated differently in the A-models and the C-models. 
I mentioned earlier a possible philosopher’s objection to some scientists’ tendency of reifying the models of the unobservables.  The objection takes such an attitude towards the models of the unobservables as mistaken because we do not seem to have any good reason not to think that the unobservables are just like the observables as they are in themselves, only they are too small or too far away for us to observe.  If so, we have no reason then to think of models for unobservables as anything more than representational devices, and what I have just said couldn’t possibly be right.  I also said earlier that this may not be the final word for the matter.  Given the origin of such models, and given how long and hard people have struggled to construct the right models for the unobservable world, I would argue that the fictional view of models has more support from the history of science and from philosophical considerations.  If Locke’s admonition is right about getting to know what the secret and unobservable powers of the external world are, which produce the impressions of color, sound, and texture in our perception, I would argue that this fictional view of the models about those secret objects and their powers draws some support from Locke’s theory of perception.  
Russell, as I discussed earlier, is surely right when he says that only structural, i.e., relational, properties are knowable via science, and qualitative properties are only knowable by acquaintance.  If so, the qualitatively described model-systems about things we have no acquaintance of can only be fictional systems.  
And finally, Frigg is not right in that not all models are representational, nor are they all fictional.  Suárez is right that some models are fictional, but he is not when he thinks of such models as only of inconsistent systems or states of affairs.  
But the ultimate question still remains for the C-models.  If they are not really representations as the A-models are, how do we explain the fact that they are thought of, and used as, representations in science?  Can the scientists and laymen alike who hold this attitude be completely mistaken?  Well, no, of course they are not entirely mistaken; there is a reality beyond the observables that is causally responsible for the observables, and the C-models are undoubtedly about that reality.  However, they are about that reality, call it representation if you like, not in the same way that the A-models represent, namely, a idealized construction of observable systems for practical convenience.  And this is precisely why I think C-models are fully fictional.  Fictional characters and events are also about reality, about the actual people and events; but they do not represent them per se, or they do not represent them the same way figures and events described in a history or biography are used to represent.  These latter are somewhat similar to the A-models (though they are quite different in many other ways) because they are idealized descriptions of the real things.  Fictional characters and events, at least those that are created by the most esteemed minds in the history of literature, are about a deeper and ‘more real’ reality.  They tell us about humanity in a way that we cannot get from reading histories and biographies.  In this respect, the C-models are exactly like fictional objects.  They show us a reality that we never learn from putting together the observable results of however exhaustive studies of reality.  Think of Mach’s suggestion for science (Mach 1950. 1984), which goes roughly as this: science should be no more than the most economic organization of the observed and observable results.  One won’t find a place for the C-models in that kind of science and therefore one won’t find the kind of understanding of reality that the C-models provides.  So, Mach and to a great extent Duhem could be interpreted as great champions for giving no place to ‘fictional thinking’ in science.  They have grudge against the A-models because they are intellectually economic and non-speculative, while C-models are neither, so they should be given a place in science.  
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^1	  The translation was made from the 2nd edition of the book which was published in 1914 as La Théorie Physique: Son Objet, Sa Structure, by Marcel Rivière & Cie., Paris.  
^2	  In Chapter 1 of the book (pp. 7-18), Duhem has argued against the appeal to explanation in physics.  The matter is unfortunately complicated by the historical context in which this argument by Duhem is made.  The target is ‘metaphysical explanation’ in Duhem’s term, and the examples mostly involve using occult qualities for explanation.  It is almost obvious that if today’s notion of scientific explanation, such as the one broached by Hempel, is used, Duhem would not have any dispute with it.  But again, Hempel’s models of scientific explanation might be faulted as insufficient for such a notion precisely because it eschews its metaphysical implications.   
^3	  Models in Duhem’s conception are obvious a small proper subset of the models that are currently regarded as such.  Originally, by models Duhem really meant mechanical models; but even if we loosen this restriction and take them to be more than mechanical models, Duhem’s models are still much closer to the common sense conception of scientific models than any contemporary philosophers’ models.  The context of discussion in this paper should make it clear which notions of models we are talking about in a particular instance.  
^4	  A further question is of course a central question in philosophy of mind about what exactly happens when we perceive the world around us.  Do we perceive it primarily pictorially?  There must be judgments mixed in but then how do it work?  For answers to these and many other related questions, see for instance, Siegel 2011, in which a Rich Content View of perception is defended.  See also, Freeman 1991.
^5	  There is in all this a big and fundamental epistemic assumption, which some epistemologists may not accept; and that is that we represent the world around us primarily by images or impressions in our head.  This assumption goes back at least to Descartes and is the basis for British empiricism as in Locke and Hume.  It is possible not to accept this assumption and think that we directly perceive objects outside without any mental representation of them (such as in Reid’s direct realism).  It would be difficult to account for images in memory with such a position but it is not an impossible position to hold.  
^6	  Notice the difference between ‘water’, which mentions the word in the sentence, and W, which uses the letter that stands for the molecular model of water.  The question is how similar or different does the word represents water as W does.  
^7	  I am here using ‘iconic’ or ‘pictorial’ to refer to qualitative images of all kinds in our experience; it is not only ‘visual.’  A more technical term for this might be Russell’s ‘percept’ or ‘perceptual.’  
^8	  There should be little doubt that our senses create in our mind pictorial images of what come through them; and it is also what we see assumed in the history of philosophy.  
^9	  Here I use the metaphysical theory of individuation by Peter Strawson (1959).  
^10	  We should realize that both models and fictional characters are abstract in the minimal sense that they do not exist spatiotemporally.  But this minimal condition they share does not negate the obvious differences I am trying to point out here.  We could think of the difference between models and fictional characters as the difference of degrees of abstraction.  I shall come back to this point later.  
^11	  Such names as Benthem, Meinong, Vaihinger, and Frege, Russell, and Kripki come to mind, but for a brief history and literature of this area, see Thomasson 1999 and Frigg 2010.  
^12	  Non-essential statements include statements about actors who play certain characters and dramatizations of fictional events, etc.  Any statement that is about anything in the actual world that is used to dramatize the fictional must be regarded as not about the fictional or non-essentially about the fictional, and its semantics has nothing to do with the semantics for fiction.
^13	  The identity of such worlds has a theory of its own; but fictional worlds can be shared by multiple works as long as they are intended to share the same world, otherwise even if the worlds are more or less related to the same actual world, they may not have anything in common.  However, there are problems such as whether Emma’s India in Pride and Prejudice is the same as Holmes’ India and whether the India there is a fictional or an actual place (given that India is never described in any detail in either work).  
^14	  Thomasson (1999) calls her theory of fiction ‘the artifactual theory,’ and thinks of the fictional worlds or characters as “abstract artifacts – relevantly similar to entities as ordinary as theories, laws, governments, and literary works” (p. xi).  In the minimal sense, if one accepts Thomasson’s theory, one must think of models as fiction, unless one thinks that models and theories are categorically different.  However, I think the sense in which Thomasson identifies fiction as artifactual is so minimal that it does not relieve us from investigating in what exact sense is a model fictional.  On the other hand, Thomasson’s somewhat casual identification of say fiction with theories is still controversial.  It is not clear whether one can straightforwardly say that characters in a novel are relevantly similar to chemical elements in a theory.  
^15	  For lack of space I shall not further discuss this connection with Goodman’s work on ‘worldmaking’ and science in general.  It will be the focus of another full-length study.  
^16	  Note here, we think of fictional characters and events as particulars only in the fictional world.  Sherlock Holmes is an individual in the Holmes’ world because he does occupy space and time in that world, although he does occupy any actual space-time regions (some books in which he ‘lives’ do occupy such regions but that’s beside the point).  Also, electromagnetic force line in a model cannot occupy any space-time regions, actual or otherwise; only its tokens can do that.  And so, it is not even a particular in any imagined worlds.  
^17	  Here the term ‘mythology’ is used in its broadest sense.  It might be too much to call Plato’s philosophy a mythology, but certainly I am regarded it here as having heavy mythological elements.  
